American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (Book Review) by Van Der Slik, Jack
Volume 39 Number 4 Article 8 
June 2011 
American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (Book 
Review) 
Jack Van Der Slik 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege 
Recommended Citation 
Van Der Slik, Jack (2011) "American Grace: How Religion Divides and 
Unites Us (Book Review)," Pro Rege: Vol. 39: No. 4, 47 - 49. 
Available at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege/vol39/iss4/8 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the University Publications at Digital Collections @ 
Dordt. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pro Rege by an authorized administrator of Digital Collections @ Dordt. 
For more information, please contact ingrid.mulder@dordt.edu. 
Pro Rege—June 2011     47 
Putman, Robert, and David E. Campbell, with assistance from Shaylyn Romney Garrett. American Grace: 
How Religion Divides and Unites Us. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010. 673 pages. ISBN 978-1-4165-6671-
7 and 978-1-4165-6688-5 (e-book). Reviewed by Jack R. Van Der Slik, Professor of Political Studies and 
Public Affairs emeritus, University of Illinois, Springfield.
Putnam and Campbell have given us a “big book” 
that will be cited and commented on in a wide range of  
popular as well as sociopolitical literature. Large in size, 
putatively a groundbreaking work of  political research, 
it has been written to be read not only by students and 
academics but by anyone who takes part in or takes 
offense at religious observance in America. Reviews of  
it appear not simply in academic media but in the New 
York Times and other widely circulated publications. The 
subject studied is religious behavior in America, with 
attention to how such behavior intersects with American 
politics. When common courtesy suggests that in polite 
conversation folks should avoid introducing their ideas 
of  either religion or politics, one can anticipate views 
expressed here that will offend sensitivities about both 
realms.
The authors take into account a vast array of  
data, reaching back to behavior in the 1950s and since 
(footnotes fill pages 571-647). However, most of  the 
analysis especially scrutinizes Faith Matters surveys, the 
main one conducted in 2006 (3108 respondents) and 
a follow-up in 2007 (1909 respondents). The authors 
compare their results to the General Social Survey, 
2006, and various Gallup polls. To keep the analysis 
understandable, data are presented graphically and in 
percentages, with statistical controls and methodological 
details mercifully reported in the appendix and the notes. 
One of  the helpful measures that the authors use is a 
religiosity index. It combines survey responses from 
individuals regarding six questions (attendance, frequency 
in prayer, religion in daily life, how religion affects “who 
you are,” strength of  belief  in “your religion,” strength of  
belief  in God), seeking to override parochialism by using 
the relevant responses common among “all religious 
traditions.” With this index the authors distinguish five 
quintiles (20 percent of  respondents in each) of  religious 
intensity from least to most. By using this measure, the 
authors can cross-classify religious intensity with other 
variables of  interest.
Another tool of  analysis is the authors’ taxonomy of  
American religious practice. Protestants are distinguished 
into three types—Evangelical Protestants (30 percent 
of  the population), Black Protestants (8 percent), and 
Mainline Protestants (14 percent). And then there are 
Catholics (24 percent) and “Nones,” people who report 
no religious affiliation (17 percent). Jews (2 percent), 
Mormons (2 percent) and “Other faiths,” such as 
Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs and others (3 percent) 
comprise the remainder. Except at specific points, most 
of  the analysis uses the five largest categories of  religious 
affiliation.
In a surprising move, the authors enrich their account 
with reportorial vignettes that describe in surprising 
detail contemporary portraits of  a cross-section of  
individual church congregations. Pro Rege readers who are 
faithful to their own congregations and denominations 
will find it enlightening to read close-ups about the 
habits, outlooks, and practices of  worshipers in eight 
congregations (about 15 pages in each) such as Bethel 
African Methodist Episcopal Church in Druid Heights 
near Baltimore, Maryland; St. Pius V Catholic Church in 
the Lower West Side, Chicago, Illinois; and Living Word 
Christian Center in Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
The readers of  American Grace will find a number of  
unsurprising points in the reported findings. The United 
States exceeds most of  the industrialized nations of  the 
world in religious observance. Thirty-eight percent of  
Americans report being active members of  a church 
or religious organization. More women are actively 
involved in churches than men. The greatest recent 
decline in religious participation has occurred in Mainline 
Protestant churches. Substantial political activity within 
congregations takes place in Black Protestant churches.
Perhaps less expected, even surprising, are the 
following: African Americans are far more religious than 
whites, even when compared to white evangelicals. More 
of  them attend church weekly, more report that religion 
is important to their daily lives, more report that religion 
bears upon their important decisions and that religion 
is an important part of  their identity (275-76). Against 
a backdrop of  changing roles for women in the United 
States since the 1960s and a common preference among 
Christians for women to run their homes and leave the 
breadwinning to men, both religious and secular women 
entered the workforce “at about the same rate” (237). 
Participation in the world of  work rose for both highly 
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religious women and highly secular ones—for the 
religious, 40 percent in 1973 to 56 percent in 2008; for 
the secular, 41 percent in 1973 to 60 percent in 2008. 
In short, religious tenets and religious institutions did 
not deter religious women from economic enterprise. 
Moreover, there is a growing consensus among both 
men and women favoring a bigger role for women in 
their churches.
Within the widening gap between haves and have-
nots in America, religiosity is correlated with greater 
class bridging. The fact is that more religiously observant 
Americans have friendships and social interactions with 
people on welfare or those doing manual work than do 
their secular counterparts. Moreover, this is especially 
true among Evangelical Protestants, whose fellow church 
members are diverse in employment and highly social in 
their behavior.
Religiosity is highly correlated with good 
neighborliness. The more religious not only volunteer 
more for religious causes, they more commonly volunteer 
for secular causes than do their secular counterparts. 
Similarly, “Regular churchgoers are more likely to give to 
secular causes than non-churchgoers, and highly religious 
people give a larger fraction of  their income to secular 
causes than do most secular people” (448).
What is the explanation for partisan polarization 
along religious lines? To summarize the analysis and 
argument, Putnam and Campbell identify distinct eras 
and the popular shifts that occurred in them regarding 
the relationship of  religion and politics. In the 1950s, an 
era when church attendance was at its zenith in American 
life, religious and political cleavages were cross cutting 
and not correlated. There were religious liberals and 
conservatives among both Republicans and Democrats. 
There was little correspondence between religious 
identities and partisan identities when the candidates 
were Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson.
From the mid-1960s into the early 1970s the themes 
of  sex, drugs, rock and roll, anti-Vietnam activism, 
women’s liberation, “God is dead,” and the like, marked 
the unleashing of  a libertine social culture. There was 
a substantial decline in popular confidence regarding, 
among other things, Christian religious institutions. 
A drastic demoralization occurred particularly among 
Mainline Protestant leaders and members. American 
Catholics were struggling with the meaning and 
consequences of  Vatican II. In fact, “The fraction of  all 
Americans who said that religion was ‘very important’ to 
them personally fell from 75 percent percent in 1952 to 
52 percent in 1978” (97-98). That percentage decline was 
even sharper among young adults.
The first aftershock emerged in the 1970s and 
1980s. In both religious and political perspectives many 
Americans were morally concerned about the changes in 
this society. The concern was particularly evident among 
Evangelical Protestants, whose church memberships 
grew especially at the expense of  Mainline Protestant 
churches. Increasingly, those Americans high on 
religiosity reflected conservative views about a politicized 
social agenda. The most persistent single issue was the 
right to life versus abortion by choice. Increasingly, the 
political players sorted themselves out in terms of  the 
appeal of  this and related issues, Democrats increasingly 
as cultural liberals and Republicans increasingly as 
cultural conservatives. Partisan politics took on the 
hue of  culture wars. Republican politicians claimed the 
conservative social agenda that conservative religious 
leaders advocated regarding public policy and personal 
morality.
In the second aftershock, registered during the 
1990s and after, particularly among a new generation of  
young Americans, survey data revealed that young adults 
viewed religion, and particularly the Religious Right, “as 
judgmental, homophobic, hypocritical, and too political” 
(121). There was a notable increase in the number of  
those who claimed to have no religious affiliation, those 
the authors call “Nones.” It is especially among them that 
there has been a backlash against the Religious Right.
What has kept Americans from being at one 
another’s throats despite the fact that in the last 35 years 
the combination of  religious and political conservatism 
has been battling against the social policies of  the 
religious and political liberals? It is essentially that the 
numbers of  intense religious and political partisans on 
either the left or the right are relatively few. Moreover 
their disagreements do not lead to total rejections of  
one another—either in religious or political terms. In 
the matter of  religious affiliation, “most Americans are 
intimately acquainted with people of  other faiths” (523). 
Indeed, 84 percent of  Americans, an overwhelming 
majority, believe that religious diversity has been good 
for America. Most Americans welcome the influence of  
religion and “an overwhelming majority of  Americans 
(92 percent) say that the construction of  a large Christian 
church in their community would either not bother them 
(55 percent) or is something they would welcome (37 
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percent)” (513). The authors find that with substantial 
consistency, people acknowledge the legitimacy of  one 
another’s beliefs, thereby building bridges of  mutual 
acceptance. As a result, “Interreligious mixing, mingling, 
and marrying have kept America’s religious melting pot 
from boiling over” (548).
It is evident that religion has greatly affected politics 
in our time and doubtless will continue to do so. But the 
authors cannot say how. The two related issues, abortion 
and homosexuality, have had polarizing effects both 
religiously and politically. Yet, both are declining in polarity 
and each in its own way. There is a growing consensus, 
including among young people, that an abortion “right” 
is not absolute and ought not to be broad, that regulation 
and limits are acceptable, and that abortion should be 
discouraged but not banned (406-414). Meanwhile, 
homosexual lifestyles are less and less controversial to 
the young, and civil unions, even marriages within that 
group, are increasingly acceptable. If  these issues provide 
declining political traction to either political party in the 
future, the distinctive partisan impact of  the “Religious 
Right” upon elections is likely to decline.
While it is not the authors’ purpose to give direction 
to Evangelicals, we can derive a sense in which America’s 
shifting political tectonics may be a good thing for the 
Christian message. The liberalizing trend in society 
toward acceptance of  homosexuality will erode its 
potency as partisan issue. (Some will recall with me 
when divorce could sink a political candidate.) Legal 
permission for abortion has narrowed. If  bright-line 
restrictions in such matters are no longer winning 
issues for Republican partisans, the change will loosen 
the ties between Evangelicals and the Republican 
political party. Meanwhile the contemporary Nones, 
though unconnected to churches, “do not seem to have 
discarded all religious beliefs and predilections.” They 
are not “atheists” or “agnostics.” Only five individuals 
out of  3108 survey respondents applied those terms to 
themselves. To the contrary, 47 percent of  the Nones 
affirmed that they were “absolutely sure of  God’s 
existence” (104). They are “spiritual, not religious….
They reject conventional religious affiliations, while 
not entirely giving up of  their religious feelings” (126). 
These observations testify about a field white for harvest. 
Turned off  by the political dogmatism of  the Christian 
Right, as the issues that mobilize that Right fade, the 
message of  God’s love for all sinners will engage many of  
the Nones. The Evangelical church has a message about 
forgiveness and salvation in Christ. The inclusiveness of  
that message has been obscured by conspicuous political 
voices that benefitted from agitating and mobilizing the 
“Christian Right.”
Putnam and Campbell have not given us a how-to 
book for Christian Evangelicals to carry out the Great 
Commission. It is a cool, dispassionate, and broadly 
gauged analysis about the intersection of  political 
and religious attitudes and practices in contemporary 
American life. However, it does uncover how diligently 
practicing Christians can become cats’ paws for hard-
eyed political practitioners keen to sloganeer their way 
into political office opportunities. Nevertheless, the high 
task of  kingdom building continues to challenge our 
Reformed community to articulate and promote God-
given norms for the America of  our day. Certainly the 
political arena offers a worthy calling for our best talents 
and creativity.  
Walker, Rob. Buying In – The Secret Dialogue Between What We Buy and Who We Are. New York: Random House, 
2008. 261 pages. ISBN: 978-1-4000-6391-8. Reviewed by Dale Zevenbergen, Instructor of Business 
Administration and Special Gifts Officer at Dordt College.
Why do we buy what we buy? Why are branding and 
advertising efforts so effective when most of  us say we’re 
not affected by them? Are consumers today really in 
control as is commonly bemoaned by marketing experts? 
The answers to these questions (and many more) are 
addressed in Buying In. Rob Walker has been observing 
American consumer culture for years and writing about it 
in columns in Slate, Fortune, GQ, and others. He currently 
writes a column for the New York Times Magazine called 
“Consumed.” Rob’s column and his websites www.
murketing.com and www.robwalker.net, as well as Buying 
In, have been very helpful resources for me as I explore 
the world of  marketing and advertising with students 
here at Dordt College.
The audience for Walker’s column, blogs, and book 
appear to be anyone interested in modern marketing and 
consumer behavior—from marketing professionals and 
entrepreneurs to students and teachers of  marketing, 
and really to anyone interested in ethical issues 
surrounding marketing and consumption. Introducing 
